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CIVIL PROCEDURE- MERE ALLEGATION OF
JUROR MISCONDUCT IS SUFFICIENT TO
VACATE A FINAL JUDGMENT-BOURETECHEVARRIA V. CARIBBEAN A VIA TION

MAINTENANCE CORP., 784 F.3D 37 (1ST CIR. 2015).
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants federal
courts the power to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate

to accomplish justice. 1 While the rule generally proclaims specific
instances that give rise to relief from a final judgment, Rule 60(b)(6) grants
federal courts broad authority to vacate final judgments for almost any

reason justifying relief so long as the court properly assesses the relevant
factors embedded within the rule. 2 In Bouret-Echevarria v. Caribbean
Aviation Maintenance Corp.' the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit decided whether the district court abused its discretion when it

denied a Rule 60(b)(6) motion asserting that the jury had been tainted by its
knowledge of a confidential settlement offer.4

The court held that the

district court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's Rule 60(b)(6)
motion because it failed to adequately weigh the relevant factors of Rule
60(b)(6).'
On November 2008, appellant's husband, Diego Vidal-Gonzales,

2

See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (listing six reasons court can vacate final judgment).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (explaining that judge can vacate judgment for any other

reason to obtain justice). The text of the rule is as follows: "[o]n motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons ... (6) any other reason that justifies relief." Id. It is important to note at the
outset, that Rule 60(b)(6) acts as a catchall provision allowing courts to vacate a final judgment
for any reason it deems fit, for justifying relief. Id. Aside from the Rule 60(b)(6) catchall
provision, the rule sets out five other instances when a court can vacate a previous judgment:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud ... misrepresentation, or misconduct
by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
3 784 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015).
4 Id. at 39.
' Id. at 40.
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was killed in a helicopter crash. 6
Subsequently, in February 2012,
appellant and her three children brought a products liability and wrongful
death action in federal district court against Robinson Helicopter Company,
the manufacturer of the helicopter, and Caribbean Aviation Maintenance
Corporation ("CAM defendants"), who repaired the helicopter, claiming
both defective design and negligent repair. It is alleged that prior to jury
deliberations, appellant's attorney received a confidential settlement offer
totaling $3.5 million.8 The appellants allegedly rejected the settlement
offer and proceeded to trial where the jury returned a unanimous verdict
absolving both defendants of liability. 9 Final judgment was entered on
March 19, 2012.0
On September 4, 2013, sixteen months after final judgment was
entered, appellants filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure seeking an evidentiary hearing to assess an allegation
that prejudicial information about appellant's rejection of the settlement
offer was improperly inserted into the jury deliberation.11 The appellants
submitted multiple affidavits reporting that Luis Irizarry, an aviation expert
who provided services in a subsequent and unrelated case, met an
individual who claimed to be the employer of a juror from appellant's
case.12 The employer informed Irizarry that the juror told him that the jury
did not award appellant any monetary damages because the jurors were
aware that she had already declined a $3.5 million settlement offer.13

6 See id. at 39 (explaining facts in detail).
7 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 39-40 (summarizing history of case and jury findings).
It is important to note that the crux of the complaint centered on a products liability case. Id.
However, embedded within the products liability case were claims for a defective helicopter
design, negligent repair of the helicopter, and wrongful death. Id. There was one lawsuit alleging
multiple complaints against the two defendants. Id.
8 Id. While the CAM defendants acknowledged they were unsuccessful in their attempt to
settle with appellants, they deny the amount referenced reflects their offer. Id. Robinson admits
that settlement was discussed a couple of times but claim no formal settlement offer was made.
ld. Robinson also claims it was unaware of any settlement offer from the CAM defendants. Id.
Appellants asserted that one defendant was to pay three million dollars of the total settlement and
the other defendant was to pay the remaining five-hundred thousand dollars. ld.
9 See id. (explaining details of jury verdict). Specifically, the jury found, "the CAM
defendants were not negligent in their repair of the helicopter, and that the Robinson's design of
the helicopter was not defective." Id.
10 See id. (giving date of judgment).
I See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 40 (explaining facts of case after jury verdict).
12 See id. "Appellants submitted affidavits from Attorney David P. Angueira ... and Lizzette
Bouret-Echevarria, the widow of the passenger killed in the helicopter crash." ld. Luis Irizarry
had testified on behalf of appellants during their trial and thereafter came across the pertinent
information in relation to a tainted jury. Id.
13 See id. at 40 (explaining conversation between employer and juror). Although the facts
are difficult to follow, it is important to note the multiple layers of hearsay at play here. See id. at
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Irizarry relayed the information to appellant's trial attorney who then
informed appellant. 14
The appellants initially filed their Rule 60(b)(6) motion for an
evidentiary hearing in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico in an attempt to vacate the prior judgment and proceed to a
new trial. 15 The district court judge denied the motion, finding that the
filing of the motion was untimely due to the eighteen-month period
between the entry of final judgment and filing of the motion, and
additionally that the materials filed in support of the motion were
insufficient. 16 On appeal, the First Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b)(6) motion without holding
an evidentiary hearing.1 7 The First Circuit reasoned that the district court
miscalculated the timeliness of the motion, did not assume the truth of factspecific statements set forth in the submitted affidavits, and did not
appreciate the inability of appellants to avoid reliance on hearsay in seeking
Rule 60(b)(6) relief.18
Motions brought under Rule 60(b) are committed to the district
court's discretion and denials of Rule 60(b) motions are reviewed only for
an abuse of that discretion.1 9 Various courts have identified specific

41 (pointing out hearsay layers).
14 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 40 (discussing juror's course of action). Appellant
attempted to retain "Attorney Angueira, a Boston attorney, and informed him of the potential
juror misconduct[.]" ld. Attorney Angueira requested that appellants ask "whether Attorney
Morales would agree to be co-counsel in order to file post-judgment motions and present
evidence" to the court. ld. at 40-41. Within twenty-four hours after being asked, Attorney
Morales informed the appellants that he was withdrawing from the case. ld. at 41. Furthermore,
Attorney Angueira called Irizarry to confirm the details of the information reported to appellants,
but Irizarry told him that he would not speak to him without the permission from Attorney
Morales. ld. Attorney Angueira called Attorney Morales to seek permission, but Attorney
Morales never picked up the phone and he never returned the call. ld.
15 Id.at42.
16 See Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d at 41 (explaining lower court's decision).

The district

court stated, "[w]hile there is no specific limit under Rule 60(b)(6), seeking relief eighteen
months after final judgment pushes against reasonableness." ld.
17 See id. at 40 ("In denying this request, the district court miscalculated the timeliness of the
motion, did not assume, as required by law, the truth of fact-specific statements set forth in
affidavits supporting the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and did not appreciate the inability of appellants,
under the unusual circumstances here, to avoid reliance on hearsay in seeking Rule 60(b)(6)
relief.").
18 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 40 (explaining reasoning behind holding district court
abused its discretion).
19 See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining Rule 60(b) motion
standard of review); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v.
Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[A]buse-of-discretion standard applies in
connection with appellate review of orders refusing to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6)."); OjedaToro v. Rivera-Mendez, 853 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Rule 60(b) motion is committed to the
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instances of abuse, including instances when a material factor carrying
significant weight is ignored or when an improper factor is relied upon.20
Generally speaking, Rule 60(b) grants federal courts the power to vacate
judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.2 1
While the rule generally promulgates six reasons for vacating a final
judgment, Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision providing relief for any
reason not otherwise covered, and so long as the motion is made in a
reasonable time.22 Although the scope of Rule 60(b)(6) could potentially
cover an extensively wide array of instances, courts have interpreted the
rule to require a showing of "extraordinary circumstances," such as a
violation of due process rights or other constitutional protections,
effectively creating a high threshold for appellants to overcome. 23 This

discretion of the district court and may be reversed only upon a finding of an abuse of that
discretion."); Mitchell v. Hobbs, 951 F.2d 417, 420 (1st Cir. 1991) (describing Rule 60(b) motion
standard of review).
20 See Indep. Oil & Chem. Workers of Quincy, Inc., v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d
927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is
ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are
assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them."); Superline, 953 F.2d at 19
(discussing Rule 60(b) motion); Mitchell, 951 F.2d at 420 (same). In the case at hand, the First
Circuit focused on the district court's abuse of discretion when analyzing the factors of Rule
60(b)(6). See Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d at 41-42 (discussing abuse of discretion in Rule
60(b)(6) motion context); cases cited supra note 19 (explaining instances where courts have
analyzed lower court's abuse of discretion).
21 FED. R. Crw. PRO. 60(b); see Klaprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949)
(stating Rule 60(b) vested federal courts with the "power... to vacate judgments whenever such
action is appropriate to accomplish justice."); Superline, 953 F.2d at 19 (noting purpose of Rule
60(b)).
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (listing reasons justifying relief). The language of the rule
encompasses six reasons:
[T]he court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Ild.See also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (noting
timing issues associated with Rule 60(b)(6)); Hollee S. Temple, Raining On The Litigation
Parade:Is It Time To Stop Litigant Abuse Of The Fraud On The Court Doctrine?, 39 U.S.F. L.
REV. 967, 972-75 (2005) (highlighting purpose of Rule 60(b)(6)).
23 See Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 614-15 (1949) (analyzing extraordinary circumstances); DavilaAlvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Moreover, to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), 'a party must show "extraordinary
circumstances" suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay."' (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs.
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993))). Courts have not explicitly
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high threshold required by Rule 60(b)(6) suggests there is a definitive need
to balance the finality of judgments with the need to accomplish justice. 24
To balance these two opposing policies, courts considering motions
under Rule 60(b)(6) ordinarily hone in on certain factors to aid the process
of identifying proper circumstances justifying relief, which are: (1) whether
the motion was timely; (2) whether exceptional circumstances justify
extraordinary relief; (3) whether the movant can show a potentially
meritorious claim or defense, which, if proven, could bring success at trial;
and (4) whether there is a likelihood of unfair prejudice to the opposing
party.2 5 Nonetheless, these factors must not be looked at exclusively, and
rather, they must be examined together in order to view them appropriately
under the circumstances. 26 Notably, courts have acknowledged that there is
no rule requiring them to take each factor into account in every case;

stated which circumstances are deemed "extraordinary"; however, extensive case law supports
the notion that "extraordinary circumstances" include violations of constitutional rights, such as
the due process rights at issue in this case.
24 See Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 248 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001) ("There
must be an end to litigation someday and therefore district courts must weigh the reasons
advanced for reopening the judgment against the desire to achieve finality in litigation." (quoting
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950))); see also United States v. One Urban
Lot, 882 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting Rule 60(b)(6) relief is "'extraordinary relief' which
should be granted 'only under exceptional circumstances"' (quoting Lepore v. Vidockler, 792
F.2d 272, 274 (1st Cir. 1986))).
25 See Superline, 953 F.2d at 20 (detailing Rule 60(b) motion criterias). A common goal of
all courts is to ensure that vacating a judgment after analyzing these four factors will not be an
empty exercise. See Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 769 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[A] threshold condition
for granting the relief is that the movant demonstrate that granting the relief will not in the end
have been a futile gesture[.]"); Lepkowski v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 804 F.2d 1310,
1314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("motions for relief under Rule 60(b) are not to be granted unless the
movant can demonstrate a meritorious claim or defense[.]"); Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d
96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[C]ourts require that a movant under Rule 60(b) assume the burden of
showing a meritorious defense . . . as a threshold condition to any relief whatsoever under the
Rule."); In re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir. 1978) (requiring meritorious defense for
relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b)); Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989)
(asserting presence or absence of meritorious defense is considered with Rule 60(b) motion);
Marshall v. Monroe & Sons, Inc., 615 F.2d 1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 1980) (explicating precondition
with respect to Rule 60(b)(1)). See generally Luke J. Gilman & Angeles Garcia, Fifth Circuit
Survey-Civil Procedure, 47 TEx. TECH L. REv. 449, 454-56 (2015) (noting three recent cases
dealing with Rule 60(b)(6) issues); Mary C. Cavanagh, InterpretingRule 60(b)(6) Of the Federal
Rules Of Civil Procedure: Limitations On Relief From Judgments For "Any Other Reason" 7
SUFFOLK. J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 127, 131-33 (2002) (explaining grounds for denial of relief).
26 See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]his
compendium is neither exclusive nor rigidly applied. Rather, the listed factors are incorporated
into a holistic appraisal of the circumstances."); see also Superline, 953 F.2d at 20 (discussing
factors cannot be rigidly applied); Zang, 248 F.3d at 5 (noting proper application of Rule 60(b)(6)
factors).
The court in Zang notes that a Rule 60(b)(6) analysis rests on fact-specific
considerations informed by the nature and circumstances of each particular case. Zang, 248 F.3d
at 5-6.
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sometimes just one factor dominates
the others to such an extent that it
2
undoubtedly determines a result. 7
When analyzing the timeliness of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, courts
have held that a "reasonable" period of time is measured from the time at
which a movant could have filed his or her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and the
time when he or she did in fact file the motion. 28 Additionally, relief under
the rule requires a showing that exceptional circumstances justify
extraordinary relief.29 For instance, when there is an allegation of a tainted
jury there are serious due process implications that courts have deemed to
fall under the umbrella of an exceptional circumstance justifying
extraordinary relief.30 Furthermore, when considering whether or not to
vacate a judgment, courts must ensure that doing so will not be a waste of
the court's time or an empty exercise. 31 The last factor-the likelihood of
unfair prejudice-must extend beyond the normal inconveniences of
litigation; courts have stated that the mere cost and
time of re-litigating a
32
case does not amount to unfair prejudice on its face.

27

See Ungar, 599 F.3d at 86 ("In an effort to salvage the judgment, the plaintiffs argue that a

court need not do a mechanical, multi-factor analysis every time a party seeks relief under Rule
60(b)(6). That is true: there is no ironclad rule requiring an in-depth, multi-factor analysis in
every case.").
28 See, e.g., Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 607-16 (1949) (holding four-year gap timely in
denaturalization case when seeking to set aside judgment); Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274,
280 (1st Cir.1993) (finding sixteen-month delay unreasonable because settlement occurred two
months after entry of order of dismissal); United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114 at 1122 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding five-year lapse timely when opposing party changed its mind about executing
judgment).
29 See Superline, 953 F.2d at 19-20 ("The need to harmonize these competing policies has
led courts to pronounce themselves disinclined to disturb judgments under the aegis of Rule 60(b)
unless the movant can demonstrate that certain criteria have been achieved. In general, these
criteria include (1) timeliness, (2) the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying
extraordinary relief[.]").
30 See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) ("Due process means a jury capable and
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to
prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they
happen."). Furthermore, Rule 606(b) states, "a juror may testify about whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention" or whether any "outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 45
(illustrating Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) for verdict impeachments). If such testimony brings
any external influences, the court must determine whether such extraneous information was
prejudicial by determining its probable effect on a hypothetical average juror. United States v.
Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 261-62 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining presumption of prejudice when "third
party communication ... injects itself into the jury process.").
31 See Superline, 953 F.2d at 20 ("as a precondition to relief under Rule 60(b), [a party] must
give the trial court reason to believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.")
32 See United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 763 F.2d 181, 183
(5th Cir. 1985)
(requiring party to re-litigate an action does not amount to prejudice); Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d
73, 77 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding no prejudice from passage of time and requiring party to show
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In Bouret-Echevarria v. CaribbeanAviation Maintenance Corp.,
the court analyzed each of the aforementioned factors in determining that
the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's Rule 60(b)(6)
motion for an evidentiary hearing.3 3 First, the court spent a considerable
amount of time analyzing the timeliness factor of Rule 60(b)(6) and noted
that the proper measure of a "reasonable" period of time for the purposes of
the rule is the time at which the appellants could have filed their Rule
60(b)(6) motion against when they did in fact file the motion.3 4 The court
reasoned that the earliest time the appellants could have filed their Rule
60(b)(6) motion was when the appellants first learned of the allegations of
juror misconduct-four months prior to the date they filed their motionrather than the day when final judgment was entered.3 5 Additionally, the
court noted that the district court erred when it determined that the eighteen
months between the entry of judgment and the filing of the Rule 60(b)(6)
motion was unreasonable; however it reasoned that it would have been
nearly impossible for the appellants to have filed their motion any earlier
because they did not have knowledge of any accusation of juror
misconduct.3 6 In its analysis of the second factor under Rule 60(b)(6), the
court noted that if an allegation of jurors' awareness of the confidential
settlement offer is true, it surely would amount to an exceptional
circumstance, justifying the extraordinary relief of vacating the final
judgment.3 More importantly, the court reasoned that there are serious

evidence of prejudice).
33 See generally Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 43-49 (analyzing appropriate factors of Rule
60(b)(6)). While the court analyzed each of the four factors, it also noted that the factors were not
exhaustive and that a court was not restricted to only those factors. Id. at 44. Therefore, the court
expanded its reasoning to include other factors aligning with the policy concerns behind the
existing factors. Id. at 43, 46-49.
34 See cases cited supra note 28 (explaining reasonable period of time for Rule 60(b)(6)
motion).
35 See Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d at 44 ("The district court, however, measured the
reasonableness of appellants' delay in bringing forth their Rule 60(b)(6) motion from the entry of
final judgment, not from the time that appellants first learned of the allegations of juror
misconduct.").
36 See id. ("In making its determination that eighteen months was unreasonable, the district
court did not address the fact that the earliest appellants could have brought their Rule 60(b)(6)
motion was May 22, 2013, the day they learned of the potential misconduct."). The court went
into fact-specific detail as to why the appellants could not have filed their motion any earlier,
specifically because appellants' counsel was actively attempting to substantiate the motion and
find local counsel with whom to associate. ld. Summarily, the court reasoned that the eighteen
months between entry of final judgment and the filing of the motion was reasonable. Id.
37 See id. at 45 (explaining juror's knowledge of confidential settlement offer as a violation
of due process); supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing exceptional circumstances
justifying extraordinary relief). The court in Smith v. Phillips explained that if a jury is aware of
and bases its decision on knowledge that will affect a jury's impartiality, there has been a
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due process implications of a tainted jury as well as convincing policy
concerns surrounding the necessity of maintaining juror privacy."
The court then briefly analyzed whether the claim had enough
merit to vacate the judgment and whether filing the motion would result in
unfair prejudice to the defendants.3 9 Specifically, the court reasoned that
40a
the claim possessed enough merit to satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) relief
Furthermore, the court held that the appellant's pursuit of a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion would not unfairly prejudice the defendants because the only
possible hardship would be the normal costs and time commitments
associated with litigation.4a The court expanded its reasoning beyond the
four factors under Rule 60(b)(6) and noted that the essence of the district
court's abuse of discretion occurred when it dismissed fact-specific
allegations in the appellant's affidavits as mere rumor rather than assuming
the truth of such fact-specific statements contained in the motion. 2 The

violation of due process. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 217 ("Due process means a jury capable and
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to
prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they
happen.").
38 Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d at 45. The court stated:
In recognition of the due process implications of a tainted jury, and the need to
maintain juror privacy, our law provides for the exploration of the influence of
extraneous information on the deliberations of a jury under controlled circumstances.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) states that a "juror may testify about whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention" or
whether any "outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." If the
existence of external influences is established through such testimony, the court must
determine whether such extraneous information was prejudicial by determining its
"probable effect on a hypothetical average juror."
ld. (citing United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 262 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Boylan, 898 F.2d
at 261 (discussing presumption of prejudice exists when "third party communication ... directly
injects itself into jury process.").
39 See Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d at 45 (analyzing last two factors of Rule 60(b)(6)).
4o d. ("Although the jury found neither negligence on the part of the CAM defendants nor a
product defect on the part of Robinson, this case had enough merit to get to the jury. If the jury
knew of the settlement offer when it rejected appellants' case, we cannot say that a retrial without
that proscribed information would be an empty exercise.").
41 See id.at 45-46 (explaining reasoning behind holding that last two factors were satisfied).
With respect to whether or not the appellants had a meritorious claim, the court explained that as
a precondition to relief a party must give the trial court reason to believe that vacating judgment
would not be an empty exercise. ld. at 46; see Superline, 953 F.2d at 20 (analyzing whether
vacating judgment is empty exercise). The court also reasoned that the CAM defendant's claim
of unfair prejudice was insufficient because the majority of their claims appeared to be nothing
more than the usual inconveniences any party faces when forced to re-litigate. Bouret-Echverria,
783 F.3d at 46.
42 Bouret-Echevarria, 783 F.3d at 46-47.
The district court ruled that the affidavits
submitted by appellants in support of their Rule 60(b)(6) motion were "insufficient to push the
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court noted that although the district court may have been correct to

categorize the fact-specific statements as impermissible hearsay, it "failed
to appreciate the critical fact that appellants could not [have] obtain[ed]
fact-specific statements beyond the" affidavits submitted in their request
for an evidentiary hearing. 4' Lastly, the court noted that a finding of an
abuse of discretion, and then granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief, could create
some uncertainty about the finality of a judgment; however the court
reasoned that the due process values protected by Rule 60(b)(6) are
pertinent to accomplish justice.4 4
The First Circuit's reasoning was structured elegantly to touch

upon the factors of the rule first and then to the more significant underlying
issues behind Rule 60(b)(6). 45 The First Circuit did, however, seem to rely
too heavily on the appellant's arguments surrounding each of the four
factors of the rule.46 For example, the court spent a significant amount of
time explaining what constitutes a "reasonable" time limit under the
timeliness factor of Rule 60(b)(6) and it also spent a considerable amount
of time explaining what constitutes unfair prejudice and exceptional

Plaintiffs' claims beyond the daunting threshold required by Rule 60(b) . . . if they 'were
sufficient to force a court to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court would be potentially required
in any civil case to grant an evidentiary hearing following a jury verdict based on mere rumors,
regardless of how much time had elapsed since judgment."' ld. The First Circuit reasoned that
the district court is not legally allowed to assume facts in affidavits to be false or mere rumors.
Id. It stated that the district court failed to recognize a proposition of law that applies to a district
court's consideration of allegations underlying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, ld.;
see Superline, 953 F.2d
at 18 ("In the first instance, an inquiring court should assume the truth of fact-specific statements
contained in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion."). The First Circuit then noted that specific facts in the
appellants' affidavits, specifically the communications relating to juror misconduct and details
surrounding the confidential settlement offer, could not be dismissed as mere rumor given that
they had a probative weight, which the district court ignored. Id.
43 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 47 (explaining district court's treatment of hersay).
The appellants could not have obtained any further fact-specific statements because their attorney,
Attorney Morales, refused to talk to their current attorney and the key expert witness, Irizarry,
refused to talk to anyone as well. ld. at 47-48. Therefore, the appellants were very limited in
their facts alleging juror misconduct. ld. Furthermore, appellants' attorney was barred from
contacting any jurors due to a local law that prohibited "post-verdict communication with jurors
except under court supervision." Id. at 48-49.
44 See id.at 49 ("We do not minimize the importance of finality of judgments or protecting
the privacy of jurors. Yet we must also consider the due process values implicated by jury
deliberations free of extraneous influences. Indeed, Rule 60(b)(6) exists, in part, to protect such
values, and, in so doing, to 'accomplish justice.' Inescapably, there is a tension here between the
values of finality and due process .... [T]he district court denied the request for an evidentiary
hearing, and thereby concluded that the value of due process must necessarily be sacrificed for
the value of finality.").
45 See generally Bouret-Echevarria,743 F.3d at 43-50 (analyzing underlying factors of Rule
60(b)(6)).
46 See id. (explaining essential aspects of each factor).
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circumstances.4
While an assessment of each factor should be given
weight in making a proper determination in this case, the district court, and
even the First Circuit, was correct to note that a decision should not depend
solely on whether one or more factors of a rule have been satisfied. 8
Therefore it could be inferred that the First Circuit made its decision based
on the fact that the timeliness factor was indeed satisfied but, as Justice
Barron-the dissenting justice-notes, the failure to properly assess one
factor should not have been the reason for the reversal.4 9 An abuse of
discretion does not arise when a court fails to properly assess merely one
factor; therefore, if the District Court properly considered the substance of
the motion rather than its form, then it is likely that the court did not abuse
its discretion.50
In addition to focusing on whether the district court properly
weighed the relevant factors of the rule, the appellees extended their
arguments beyond a multifactor analysis and rightfully crafted arguments
around how far the district court should have gone in assuming the truth of
the fact-specific statements contained in the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 1 While

47 See id.
at 43-46 (analyzing unfair prejudice and exceptional circumstances).
48

See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 50 (Barron, J., dissenting) (stating majority should not

reverse based on satisfaction of one factor). In his dissent, Judge Barron notes that the district
court's treatment of the timeliness factor cannot warrant reversal. Id. Specifically, he states,
The majority suggests that the District Court erred in assessing the timeliness of the
Rule 60(b) motion and in failing to give sufficient credence to the allegations contained
in the supporting affidavits. But any error in the District Court's treatment of the
timeliness of the motion cannot warrant reversal because the District Court did not rest
the denial solely on that basis. We thus may reverse only if the District Court erred in
how it responded to the substance of the allegation contained in the affidavits that the
jury was exposed to a settlement offer. I do not see, however, how the District Court
erred in that regard.
Id.
49 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (stating majority should not reverse based on

satisfaction of one factor).
50 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 50 (Barron, J., dissenting) ( "We thus may reverse
only if the District Court erred in how it responded to the substance of the allegation contained in
the affidavits that the jury was exposed to a settlement offer. I do not see, however, how the
District Court erred in that regard.").
51 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 50 (Barron, J., dissenting) ( "As the majority notes, a
district court is required to assume 'the truth of fact-specific statements contained in' a Rule
60(b)(6) motion."). The majority also noted this exact requirement of Rule 60(b), that a district
court must assume the truth of the facts submitted in the motion. Id. at 47. Trial courts generally
are given great deference in evidentiary rulings mostly because they are in the best position to
hear and assess all testimony in the relevant context. Todd J. Bruno, Say What?? Confusion In
The Courts Over What The ProperStandard Of Review For Hearsay Rulings, 18 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVoc. 1, 26-28 (2013). The Tenth Circuit explained, "[g]iven the fact- and casespecific nature of hearsay determinations, 'our review of those decisions is especially
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the majority agreed that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion requires the district court to
assume the truth of fact-specific statements, its holding seems somewhat
hypocritical given the fact that it allowed "layers of hearsay" to be injected
into the appeal.52 The district court did indeed assume the truth of the facts
in the motion-that there was a mere allegation, or a "rumor," of juror
5
misconduct>.
Nevertheless, the First Circuit, in finding that the factspecific portions of the motion could not be dismissed as mere rumor,
admitted what seems to be impermissible hearsay and effectively assumed
more than just the truth of the facts submitted in the Rule 60(b) motion.54

deferential."' See id.(quoting United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Appellate courts ordinarily review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion as it pertains to
questions of law rather than questions of fact. Bruno, supra note 32, at 27-28 (2013). Appellate
courts do not usually review evidentiary hearings de novo, unless the review involves in depth
statutory interpretation, ld.;
see also State v. Robinson, 270 P.3d 1183, 1198 (Kan. 2012)
("Ordinarily, we review the admission of hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion. However,
the issue of whether the trial court complied with specific statutory requirements for admitting
evidence requires statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.").
52 Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 47. The majority stated:
There were layers of hearsay in the report of jury misconduct: an unidentified party
telling Irizarry that one of the party's employees, also unidentified, was a juror in
Bouret-Echevarria's trial, and that this juror told the unidentified party that the jury
declined to award appellant any money damages because they knew she had been
offered and rejected a $3.5 million settlement. Ordinarily, the district court would be
correct that such rumors, despite the concerns that they engendered in Morales and
Irizarry, would not justify an evidentiary hearing. Here, however, the district court
failed to appreciate the critical fact that appellants could not obtain fact-specific
statements beyond the reports of Morales and Irizarry in requesting an evidentiary
hearing.
Id.
53 See id. at 50 (Barron, J., dissenting) ("The District Court was thus obliged to take as true
that a report of juror misconduct reached the petitioner Bouret-not that the juror made the
report, or even that the juror's employer passed the report to the expert witness Irizarry. But that
being all that must-or even legally can-be taken as true, I do not see what the District Court
did wrong.").
54 See id.at 47 ("These fact-specific portions of Bouret-Echevarria's motion could not be
dismissed as mere rumor. They had a probative weight that the district court ignored."). It is
important to note the distinction between the majority and the dissent here: the majority admitted
factual allegations, specifically the aforementioned layers of hearsay, and held that, although it
was mere rumor, it gave rise to a furthering of the appeal. Id. As the dissent notes, the district
court did not abuse its discretion because the fact-specific statements merely alleged that there
was juror misconduct. ld. at 50 (Barron, J., dissenting). Since the allegations were unsupported
and classified as "layers of hearsay" and "rumor" the district court properly refused to investigate
the allegations any further. ld. Even if the district court acted in an unreasonable fashion when it
refused to investigate further, it did not likely give rise to a total abuse of discretion that should
result in a reversal of its decision. See id. ("I do not believe a different view about how
discretion should be exercised in the face of a petition based on such an unsubstantiated rumormade well after a final verdict-supplies a sufficient reason to conclude that discretion was

206

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

Although the court may have acted reasonably when it agreed that there
were no other means of obtaining sufficient information and therefore the
matter should have been investigated further, the matter did not necessarily
warrant a finding
• •
• that
55 the district court abused its discretion in denying
further investigation.
The district court did not unreasonably weigh
material factors or make any mistakes in its analysis; rather, it reasonably
decided not to permit rumors and unsubstantiated claims to be brought in as
evidence for vacating a prior judgment.56
Putting the rules of evidence and civil procedure aside for a
moment, this case seems to draw attention to a larger policy consideration:
the value of a final judgment versus the importance of due process rights.
On one hand, ensuring that judgments are made final hits at the core of
maintaining civil and criminal process and keeping litigants from engaging
in frivolous matters.58
On the other hand, affording each party their
respective due process rights protects against injustice and ensures that
each party is given a fair shot at being heard. 59 Here, the First Circuit
arrives at its decision partly based on the principle of fairness and affording
appellants their due process rights; however, the standard specifically noted
within the case centered on an "abuse of discretion" neither procedural nor
substantive due process. 60 It would not be at all unreasonable to conclude

abused or exercised unreasonably.").
55 See cases cited supra note 20 (explaining instances giving rise to abuse of discretion). In
order for a court to find that a lower court abused its discretion, a material factor deserving
significant weight must have been ignored, an improper factor must have been relied upon, or the
court made a serious mistake in weighing the factors. See cases cited supra note 20 (applying
higher standard for abuse of discretion).
56 See supra note 52 (identifying layers of hearsay).
57 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 49 ("We do not minimize the importance of finality of
judgments or protecting the privacy of jurors. Yet we must also consider the due process values
implicated by jury deliberations free of extraneous influences."). The First Circuit noted that the
very purpose of Rule 60(b) is to protect due process rights in order to accomplish justice. Id.; see
also Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 615 (stating that Rule 60(b) "vests power in courts" to vacate
judgments to achieve justice).
58 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 49 ("we understand that granting an evidentiary
hearing in the context of a request for 60(b)(6) relief creates temporary uncertainty about the
finality of a judgment. However, that finality remains until the court actually vacates the
judgment.").
59 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining importance of due process rights
with regards to litigation); Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 49 ("Nevertheless, influenced by the
errors in law and judgment that we have identified, the district court denied the request for an
evidentiary hearing, and thereby concluded that the value of due process must necessarily be
sacrificed for the value of finality.").
60 See supra note 18 (explaining that First Circuit is looking for abuse of discretion in
making its determination).

The court transitioned from reviewing the case for an abuse of

discretion to reviewing the case for a violation of due process, which is inconsistent with similar
appellate reviews of evidentiary hearings. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir.
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that the district court acted well within its means and power when it denied
the appellant's Rule 60(b) motion. 61 The district court merely found that
the allegation-that jurors became aware of settlement discussions and
used this awareness to reject appellant's claims against the defendant-was
unsubstantiated and essentially categorized it as inadmissible hearsay. 62 In
reversing the district court the First Circuit did exactly what historical cases

have tried to prevent-allowing courts to make policy decisions and inject
personal biases or beliefs into its decision, thus severely diminishing the
value of justice. 63
It should be restated that an abuse of discretion is typically found
when a material factor carrying significant weight is ignored or when an
improper factor is relied upon. The First Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion in denying the appellant's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. It
found that there was sufficient evidence that warranted the granting of the
motion and that the district court ignored the possibility that the facts
presented to it could have been true. Rather than adhere to the proper
standard of review when analyzing Rule 60(b)(6) cases, the First Circuit
unreasonably allowed outside factors and personal beliefs to weigh far too
heavily on its ultimate decision. A reversal should have only been
warranted if the district court acted unreasonably and ignored material
factors, an act that did not seem to be at play here. This case exemplifies
the ongoing tensions between the significance of due process rights in civil
and criminal cases and the value of the finality of judgments.

1997); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline
Transp. Co.,, 953 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Rodriguez-Antuna v. Chase Manhattan Bank
Corp., 871 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989)); see also Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Mendez, 853 F.2d 25, 28 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("[T]he treatment of a Rule 60(b) motion is committed to the discretion of the district
court and may be reversed only upon a finding of an abuse of that discretion." ); Todd J. Bruno,
Say What?? Confusion In The Courts Over What Is The Proper StandardOf Review For Hearsay
Rulings, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVoC. 1, 26-28 (2013) (noting that appellate courts
typically review evidentiary hearings for abuse of discretion).
61 See generally Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 50 n.10 (Barron, J., dissenting) ("There is no
precedent beyond Superline that elaborates on the showing that a party must make to require a
district court to hold an evidentiary hearing in circumstances akin to those presented here. But
analogous precedent from the criminal context-which the majority also takes to be relevantseems to me to support the conclusion that the District Court had considerable discretion to make
the call it made.").
62 See Bouret-Echevarria,784 F.3d at 49-50 (Barron, J., dissenting) ("But the core allegation
. . . was an 'unsubstantiated conclusion' resting on indirect sources. And I do not believe a
different view about how discretion should be exercised in the face of a petition based on such an
unsubstantiated rumor-made well after a final verdict-supplies a sufficient reason to conclude
that discretion was abused or exercised unreasonably.").
63 See generally Bouret-Echevarria, 784 F.3d at 47-50 (finding district court abused
discretion).
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